Defensive harm, consent, and intervention by Parry, Jonathan
Defensive harm, consent, and intervention
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101686/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Parry, Jonathan (2017) Defensive harm, consent, and intervention. Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 45 (4). pp. 356-396. ISSN 0048-3915 
https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12099
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
	 1	
Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention 
 
(Note: This is a pre-publication (and slightly longer) draft of a paper that is forthcoming 
in Philosophy and Public Affairs. Please cite the published versions.) 
 
Abstract: Many think that it would be wrong to defend an individual from attack if he 
competently and explicitly refuses defensive intervention. In this paper, I consider the 
extent to which the preferences of victims affect the permissibility of defending groups or 
aggregates.  These cases are interesting and difficult because there is no straightforward sense 
in which a group can univocally consent to or refuse defensive intervention in the same 
way that an individual can. Among those who have considered this question, the dominant 
view is that that consent imposes only an extremely weak constraint on defending groups. 
I argue that this is mistaken and defend a much more robust requirement. Indeed, on the 
account that I develop there are cases in which the refusal of a single member of a victim is 
enough to make it impermissible to defend a much larger group. At the heart of my 
account is the idea that consent functions as an internal component of the broader 
requirement that defensive harms be proportionate: if a victim validly refuses defensive 
intervention, the fact that defence will benefit him cannot be used to justify harming 
innocents as the lesser-evil. An important implication of this view is that what constitutes 
sufficient consent from the members of a victim group will vary on a case-by-case basis. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Contemporary discussions of the ethics of defensive harm typically focus on cases of self-
defence, featuring two main characters: aggressors and their victims. The central question 
is to explain why victims are intuitively permitted to harm aggressors, given the usual 
prohibition on killing and injuring. The standard response is that, under certain conditions, 
individuals can render themselves liable to defensive harm and thereby lose their normal 
right not to be harmed. Debate centres on what the relevant conditions for liability consist 
in. 
I will say almost nothing about liability here (in the cases I discuss I assume the 
aggressor’s liability is uncontroversial). Instead, my topic is cases of other-defence. These 
feature an additional cast member: third-party rescuers, who are able to harm aggressors in 
defence of their victims. To date, the ethics of defending others has been relatively 
unexplored.1 Of course, one explanation for this gap would be if the morality of other-
																																																						
1 The following are the only article-length discussions that I am aware of: Cécile Fabre, ‘Permissible Rescue 
Killings’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (2009), 149-164; Cécile Fabre, ‘Mandatory Rescue Killings’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007), 363-384; Seth Lazar, ‘Authorisation and the Morality of War’, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94, No. 2 (2016), 211-226; Seth Lazar, ‘Associative Duties and the Ethics of 
Killing in War’, Journal of Practical Ethics 1, No.1 (2013), 6-51; Russell Christopher, ‘Self-Defense and Defense 
of Others’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, No.2, (1998), 123-141; Eduardo Rivera-Lopez, ‘Puzzles on 
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defence were entirely determined by principles of self-defence. On this view, if it is 
permissible for a victim to inflict a certain harm on an aggressor, it follows that it is 
permissible for a third-party to do so in his defence.2 If that’s right, then there is no work 
for a theory of other-defence to do.3 
One way to justify a theory of other-defence is by showing that there are sui generis 
constraints on defending others that do not apply to self-defence. In this paper, I explore 
one important candidate, endorsed by several theorists, which focuses on the victim’s will.4 
The constraint is usually characterised as follows: 
 
Consent Requirement: Other-defence is morally justified only if those to be defended 
consent to defensive intervention. 
 
Though this captures the central idea, the requirement is implausibly restrictive as stated. 
For one, it implies that it would be impermissible to defend someone who is unable to 
consent, such as someone being attacked while sleeping or unconscious.5 But we can easily 
revise the requirement to avoid such implications: 
 
Consent Requirement*: Other-defence is morally justified only if those to be defended 
do not validly refuse defensive intervention. 
 
Though rather unwieldy, this standard for consent should be familiar from medical 
contexts. For example, if a patient requires immediate treatment for a serious illness but is 
unconscious or otherwise unable to consent, doctors may proceed with treatment without 
																																																						
Defending Others from Aggression’, Law and Philosophy 25, No.3 (2006), 377-386; George Fletcher, 
‘Defensive Force as an Act of Rescue’, Social Philosophy and Policy 7, No. 2 (1990), 170-179. 
2 Provided that defender’s defensive options are relevantly similar to the victim’s i.e. the harm is the least 
harmful means available to them, using force doesn’t involve disproportionately harming bystanders, etc.  
On this point, see Fabre ‘Permissible Rescue Killings’, pp.161-162. 
3 This is one interpretation of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s remark that “the permissibility of X killing Y goes 
hand-in-hand with the permissibility of Z killing Y in defence of X.” Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘Self-Defense’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, No.4 (1991), 283-310 at p.306. 
4 Fabre, ‘Permissible Rescue Killings’, pp.159-160; Christopher Finlay, ‘Legitimacy and Non-State Political 
Violence, Journal of Political Philosophy 18, No.3 (2010), 287-312 at pp. 290-295; Jeff McMahan, ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality’ in N. Ann Davis, Richard Kershen, and Jeff McMahan (eds), 
Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44-
72 at p.49; Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p.415; Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp.295-296. Seth Lazar also endorses a (highly qualified) version of the requirement. 
Lazar, ‘Authorisation and the Morality of War’. 
5 On this point, see Fabre ‘Permissible Rescue Killings’, pp.159-160; Finlay, ‘Legitimacy and Non-State 
Political Violence’, p.292. 
	 3	
wronging the patient (provided she has not issued prior instructions not to be treated).6 
For ease of exposition I will continue to refer to the ‘consent’ requirement on defensive 
harm, despite ‘the absence-of-valid-refusal requirement’ being the more accurate label. 
In contrast to other standard components of a theory of defensive harm – such as 
liability, proportionality, and necessity – that focus on the normative situation between 
victims and aggressors, the consent requirement draws our attention to the relationship 
between victims and rescuers.7 It holds that it can be impermissible for a rescuer to harm 
an aggressor – and may even wrong the beneficiary8 – even if the rescuer would commit no 
wrong against the aggressor. If defensible, the consent requirement establishes a moral 
asymmetry between self- and other-defence: the fact that a victim is permitted to harm 
their aggressor does not entail that third-parties may do so, since the victim may refuse 
intervention. 
The central question I want to focus on is how the consent-requirement governs 
large-scale cases of defensive force, in which groups or aggregates of individuals are the object 
of defence. In these cases, many find an analogue of the requirement very attractive. When 
it comes to military humanitarian intervention, for example, it is often argued that 
intervention is permissible only if carried out with the approval of the intended 
beneficiaries.9 But the point generalises to other contexts, such as the use of violence by 
non-state actors in defence of oppressed groups. The basic idea is that a belligerent group 
																																																						
6 This is roughly the position of the UK National Health Service. See 
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/consent-to-treatment/pages/introduction.aspx [Last accessed 7th May 
2017] 
7 This is not to deny that consent can be relevant to the permissibility of defence in virtue of affecting the 
former relationship. For example, A may consent to being harmed by B and, by doing so, waive his right not 
to be harmed by B (for example, as part of a boxing match). Since B would not wrong A by harming him, it 
would be impermissible for a third-party to harm B in defence of A. In this paper I am exclusively concerned 
with cases in which victims refuse third-party intervention directly, without consenting to being harmed by 
their attackers. 
8 Finlay ‘Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence’, p.294; McMahan ‘Humanitarian Intervention, 
Consent, and Proportionality’, p.49. 
9 See, for example, James Pattison, ‘Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Social 
Philosophy 38, No.4 (2007), 569-587; Fernando Tesón, ‘Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention’, 
Journal of Military Ethics 5, No.2 (2006), 93-113, at p.107; Fernando Tesón, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian 
Intervention’ in J.L Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 93-130, at p.107; Jeff McMahan, ‘Just 
Cause for War’, Ethics and International Affairs 19, No.3 (2005), 1-21, at p.13; Eliav Lieblich, International Law 
and Civil War: Intervention and Consent (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p.256; Richard W. Miller, ‘Respectable 
Oppressors, Hypocritical Liberators: Morality, Intervention, and Reality’, in Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. 
Scheid (eds), Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 215-250, at p.224. 
Parallel claims are also sometimes made in discussions of non-military humanitarian interventions, such as 
aid operations. For example, Scott Wisor argues that “if a particular [aid] project is opposed by its intended 
beneficiaries, then this is a near-decisive reason to reject the distribution, even if the foreseeable 
consequences of the project are still very good.” Scott Wisor, ‘How Should INGOs Allocate Resources?’, 
Ethics and Global Politics 5, No.1 (2012), 27-48, at p.43.) 
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may only resort to rebellion, revolution, or insurgency if they have the support of the 
population they claim to be protecting.10 More broadly still, we might agree with Yitzhak 
Benbaji that in practically any defensive war, including wars of national defence, “groups 
on whose behalf the war is fought…are entitled to veto the war”.11 
However, despite its intuitive appeal, it is far from straightforward how we should 
apply the consent-requirement to these cases. The problem follows from an obvious 
disanalogy between individuals and groups. Collectives are not simply individuals ‘writ 
large’.12 Rather, they are composed of individuals, each with a will and moral status of their 
own.13 Moreover, in any realistic case there is unlikely to be unanimity among the victims 
as to whether they desire defensive intervention. There is thus is no straightforward sense 
in which ‘the victims’ or ‘the beneficiaries’ can consent to (or refuse) defensive intervention 
in the same way that an individual victim can. For example, imagine that State A is weighing 
up an intervention in State B, in order to prevent State B from committing serious and 
widespread right-violations against an ethnic group within its borders. What would it take 
for State A’s intervention to qualify as having the consent of the beneficiaries? What if 
70% of the victims approve, but 30% protest? Or if 20% are in favour and 80% refuse? 
What if only a tiny handful of the beneficiaries want to be defended while the rest are 
opposed? Each of these distributions has a claim to being the correct interpretation of the 
consent-requirement, but how do we adjudicate between them? Until we settle this 
question, we cannot properly assess the case for intervention. Interestingly, the cases in 
which the consent requirement is most intuitive seem to be those in which it tells us the 
least.  
Put in more general and precise terms, examples like this raise the question of how 
a theory of defensive harm should respond to what I call multiple-victim cases. These have 
the following features:  
 
(1) An aggressor threatens unjustified harm to several victims. 
																																																						
10 See Finlay, ‘Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence’; Christopher Finlay, Terrorism and the Right to Resist: 
A Theory of Just Revolutionary War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Ch.6; Lionel MacPherson, 
‘Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?’ Ethics 117. No.3 (2007), 524-546; Michael Gross, The Ethics of Insurgency 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp.37-44. 
11 Yitzhak Benbaji, ‘Legitimate Authority in War’, in Helen Frowe and Seth Lazar (eds), Oxford Handbook of 
Ethics of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).  
12 As proponents of the ‘domestic analogy’ often imply. See, for example, Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th Ed (New York: Basic Books, 2006), Ch.4. 
13 For a classic articulation of this point, see Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), Ch.2. See also, Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 3: 
Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp.50-51. 
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(2) A rescuer has the ability to prevent the threatened harm by imposing defensive 
harm on the aggressor. 
(3) Defending every victim is a condition of defending any.14 
(4) One sub-set of the members of the victim group consent to defensive intervention, 
another sub-set refuses. 
 
In these cases, the consent requirement gives no guidance as to the permissibility of defence 
because it is indeterminate as to whether or not ‘those to be defended’ qualify as having 
consented (or, more accurately, as having not refused). To overcome this problem, the 
requirement needs to be supplemented with an aggregation principle, which tells us how we 
should move from the consent and refusal of individual victims to an all-things-considered 
judgement about whether or not the requirement has been met. My chief aim in this paper 
to provide such a principle. 
This is no easy task. Allen Buchanan has recently expressed doubts that it is even 
possible, on the ground that “there apparently is no principled way of determining how 
widespread consent must be for the consent requirement to be satisfied”. 15 Moreover, even 
if a non-arbitrary principle can be found, a different source of scepticism arises regarding 
whether the principle has any practical significance. This is the dominant view among those 
who have considered the aggregation question. According to these sceptics, the consent 
requirement imposes only a trivial constraint in multiple-victim cases, one that will be 
satisfied in practically any real-world example. More precisely, the claim is that the 
requirement is met just as long as some member(s) of the victim group do not validly refuse 
defensive intervention. 
My central thesis is that this scepticism is mistaken, and that a much more robust 
aggregation principle governs multiple-victim cases. Indeed, according to the principle that 
I will defend, there are cases in which the refusal of a single victim can make it impermissible 
to defend a larger group, even if every other member explicitly consents. Moreover, I aim to 
show that we can get to this somewhat startling conclusion without abandoning the basic 
commitments that underpin the sceptical position.  
																																																						
14 Multiple-victim cases can be synchronic (in which several victims are threatened simultaneously) or 
diachronic (in which several victims are threatened consecutively). For ease of exposition, I discuss only 
synchronic cases, but the same story can be told for diachronic cases. 
15Allen Buchanan, ‘Self-Determination, Revolution, and Intervention’, Ethics 126, No.2 (2016), 447-473 at 
n.10.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I provide some intuitive support for 
the consent requirement in single-victim cases in order to motivate the question of whether, 
and to what extent, it constrains the permissibility of defending groups. In Section 3 I move 
on to cases featuring multiple victims and explain why many are attracted to the sceptical 
view. Its appeal lies in the plausible thought that requiring anything more robust than the 
consent of a single victim would involve giving group members an unacceptable degree of 
normative control over one another.  
Section 4 presents the case for my robust aggregation principle. Drawing on 
discussions of the moral wrongness of paternalism, I argue that individuals have a 
normative power of control over whether others may act to promote their good. Just as 
others may not use my body and property without my authorisation, they may not justify 
their actions by appeal to reasons grounded in my good if I validly refuse to be benefitted. 
I term this the Power of Prudential Exclusion (PPE). In the context of defensive harm, the 
upshot of the PPE is that victims are able to constrain the reasons that rescuers can invoke 
in order to justify defensive intervention. If a victim validly refuses defensive intervention, 
the fact that defence will benefit him cannot be invoked by rescuers to justify harming 
innocents as the lesser-evil. When defending a group involves causing these harms – as in 
any realistic case of humanitarian intervention, revolution, or war – the refusal of victims 
serves to the reduce the goods that are available to justify the use of defensive force.  An 
important implication of this view is that what constitutes having ‘enough’ consent from 
the members of a victim group is context-sensitive.  It will depend on (i) how large the 
group of beneficiaries is, (ii) how many victims validly refuse defensive intervention, and 
(iii) the extent to which innocents will be harmed in the course of defending the group. To 
return to our earlier question of whether State A’s intervention would satisfy the consent 
requirement if 70%, 20%, or 1% of the beneficiaries approve, my contention is that, until 
we flesh out these details, any of these distributions could be sufficient.  
In Section 5 I consider an important objection to my proposal. The central thrust 
is that individual victims are subject to duties to rescue their co-victims, and that these 
duties place significant limits on their power to refuse defensive intervention. I argue that, 
contrary to first impressions, victims are not obligated to assist their co-victims by 
consenting to defensive harm in the relevant cases. In fact, they have no moral reason to 
do so at all. Their power to refuse therefore remains unconstrained. I conclude in Section 
6 by demonstrating some of the wider practical implications of my account, focussing on 
the case of political protest.   
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2. Support for the Consent Requirement* 
 
To help see the appeal of the consent requirement, consider the following single-victim 
case: 
Elevator 1: Victim is taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to saw 
through the elevator cable because he hates Victim and wishes him dead. 
Rescuer is walking by and is able to shoot Aggressor with her sniper rifle, 
thereby saving Victim. However, Victim refuses intervention because he is 
deeply committed to non-violence. 
 
In cases like this, many think that it would be morally impermissible for Rescuer to defend 
Victim (on the assumption that Victim has sufficient information, is not irrational, is not 
being coerced, etc.).16 The underlying idea is that victims occupy a privileged position within 
the morality of defensive harm. It’s the victim’s life that is at stake, not anybody else’s, and 
so only he gets to decide if and how it is defended.17 This tracks the more general anti-
paternalist thought that we may not interfere with a competent individual’s self-regarding 
choices simply for the sake of her own good. On these matters, the individual is sovereign.18 
																																																						
16 Jeff McMahan, for example, finds it “intuitively obvious”. ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and 
Proportionality’, p.49. See also the references in note 4 above. 
17 Fabre, ’Permissible Rescue Killings’ p.159. 
18 It might be objected that appealing to anti-paternalist intuitions in order to support the consent-
requirement is a mistake, because paradigmatic cases of paternalism have features that are lacking in cases 
like Elevator 1. For example, one might take paternalism to involve, (i) second-guessing the paternalisee’s 
judgement about what is good for them, (ii) acting due to doubts about the paternalisee’s having the required 
willpower to stick to their resolutions, and/or (iii) violating some independent claim of the paternalisee, such 
as their rights to bodily integrity or property. However, even if these are common features of paternalism, 
they are not plausibly necessary conditions, as the following two cases show: 
 
Experiment: Benny freely and competently decides take part in a medical experiment that will 
make a major contribution to finding a cure for a serious genetic disease (which Benny does not 
have). The experiment has serious side-effects that will reduce Benny’s life expectancy by one 
year. There is no compensation available for participants in the experiment. Out of concern for 
Benny’s welfare, Sally locks Benny in his house so he misses the experiment. 
 
Chocolate: Tony is an expert in nutrition who enjoys eating fatty foods, and chocolate in 
particular. He is fully aware that his diet is unhealthy and will cause him a premature death, but 
freely and competently decides that he prefers gustatory pleasures over an increased lifespan, 
and resolves to live a shorter life full of chocolatey bliss. Out of concern for Tony’s welfare, Sally 
buys all the chocolate from every shop in Tony’s hometown in order to stop him from 
purchasing any. 
 
I take it that Sally clearly acts paternalistically (and impermissibly) in both these cases. But in Experiment there 
is no disagreement between Sally and Benny about whether his choice would be good for him. Participating 
in the experiment would obviously be bad for him, but he has chosen to sacrifice his welfare for non-
prudential reasons (the good of others). So, Sally’s benevolent interference can’t involve second-guessing 
Benny’s judgement about what is good for him (For related points, see Feinberg, Harm to Self, p.62; Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, ‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 29, No.2 (2000), 205-250, at p.215; Tom Beauchamp, ‘Paternalism and Bio-Behavioral Control’, The 
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It is worth stressing, however, that we need not endorse a particularly strict form 
of anti-paternalism or self-sovereignty in order to accept the consent requirement in 
principle. Here I have in mind the Mill-inspired view that provided an individual’s choice 
is sufficiently voluntary, benevolent interference is impermissible.19 While this would 
certainly support the consent requirement, it is not necessary. As formulated, the 
requirement holds that the absence of morally valid refusal is necessary for permissible 
defence. This is compatible with a range of views about the conditions under which refusal 
is valid, including those that place constraints on the content of choices, as well as the 
procedure by which they are made. For example, one might hold that individuals cannot 
validly refuse defensive intervention if they do so for reasons that are immoral, 
unimportant, inauthentic, or just plain silly.20  
To endorse the consent requirement, all one need accept is that (i) interference 
with at least some self-regarding choices for the sake of the chooser’s good is prohibited, 
and (ii) that this includes at least some choices not to be defended by others. Of course, a 
complete account of the requirement will need to take a stand on what distinguishes valid 
from invalid refusal. But, for our purposes, we need not settle this here, since the question 
of determining the correct aggregation principle is independent of which particular 
package of procedural and content-based constraints one accepts. (In Section 5 I will 
consider a special kind of validity condition – neither procedural nor content-based – 
which is not independent in this way). Given these fairly minimal commitments, one need 
																																																						
Monist 60, No.1 (1976), 62-80, at p.78; Stephen Darwall, ‘The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the 
Will’, Ethics 116, No.2 (2006), 263-284; Scoccia, ‘The Right to Autonomy and the Justification of Hard 
Paternalism’, p.77.) In the Chocolate case, Sally is not motivated by any concerns about Tony’s lack of 
willpower. Indeed, it is precisely because he will stick to his unhealthy resolution that she is moved to 
interfere. Furthermore, Sally violates no independent claim of Tony’s by buying all the chocolate. If she were 
to purchase all the chocolate simply to consume it herself, or give it away to charity, Tony would have no 
legitimate complaint (For similar arguments against the ‘independent claims’ condition, see Shiffrin, 
‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation’, p.213; Feinberg, Harm to Self, p.9; Jonathan 
Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.79-80.) Hence, the absence 
of features (i)-(iii) in cases like Elevator 1 does not undermine the idea that Rescuer acts impermissibly in 
virtue of broadly anti-paternalist considerations. Thanks to an anonymous associate editor for prompting me 
to consider these points. 
19 For a classic modern defence, see Feinberg, Harm to Self. See also, Richard Arneson, ‘Mill versus 
Paternalism’, Ethics 90, No.4 (1980), 470-489. 
20 See, for example, Richard Arneson, ‘Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism’, Legal Theory 
11 (2005), 259-284; Victor Tadros, ‘Consent to Harm’, Current Legal Problems 64 (2011), 23-49; Peter de 
Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 34, No.1 (2006), 68-94; Peter de Marneffe, ‘Self-
Sovereignty and Paternalism’ in Christian Coons and Michael Weber (eds), Paternalism: Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 56-73; Danny Scoccia, ‘Paternalism and Respect for 
Autonomy’, Ethics 100, No.2 (1990), 318-334; Danny Scoccia, ‘The Right to Autonomy and the Justification 
of Hard Paternalism’ in Christian Coons and Michael Weber (eds), Paternalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 74-92; Daniel Brudney and John Lantos, ‘Agency and Authenticity: 
Which Values Ground Patient Choice?’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32, No.4 (2011), 217-227.  
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not share the intuition that defence would be impermissible in examples like Elevator 1 in 
order to accept the consent requirement. This may just be a case in which one’s preferred 
account of validity deems Victim’s refusal to be morally ineffective. 21  
 While most theorists who have considered cases like Elevator 1 accept some version 
of the consent-requirement, Seth Lazar has recently offered a general argument against the 
idea that victims can veto third-party intervention.22 His main argument appeals to the fact 
that a victim’s life and wellbeing is agent-neutrally valuable, giving all agents a moral reason 
to protect it. Since a victim “cannot by mere fiat prevent the continuation of his life from 
being an agent-neutral good”, Lazar concludes that any suitably situated third-party may 
permissibly defend him.23  
																																																						
21
	Here are some slightly more complicated cases, in which the consent requirement seems most compelling 
(at least to me):  
	
Excused Aggressor: Victim is taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to saw through 
the elevator cable, because he mistakenly (but not fully-culpably) believes that Victim will 
murder several innocent people unless Aggressor kills him. Rescuer is walking by and is able 
to shoot Aggressor with hsr sniper rifle, thereby saving Victim. However, Victim refuses 
intervention because he is deeply committed to non-violence. 
 
Special Relationship: Victim is taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor, who is Victim’s child, 
begins to saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victim and wishes him dead. 
Rescuer is walking by and is able to shoot Aggressor with her sniper rifle, thereby saving 
Victim. However, Victim refuses intervention because he does not want his child to be killed 
for his sake.21 
 
Non-Lethal Aggressor: Aggressor is about to kidnap Victim and lock him in his secret 
basement for six months because he hates Victim and wishes to deprive him of his liberty. 
Rescuer is walking by and is able to shoot Aggressor with her sniper rifle, thereby saving 
Victim. However, Victim refuses intervention because he is deeply committed to non-
violence. 
 
I assume that Aggressor remains liable to defensive killing in all three examples. But I take it that even the 
sceptical reader will feel the intuitive pull of the consent requirement in at least some of these cases. 
Moreover, the additional factors introduced above will be present in many real-world multiple-victim cases. 
For example, excused aggressors are fairly ubiquitous in armed conflicts, since many combatants who 
participate in unjust wars possess partial excuses for doing so, due to immaturity, ignorance, or duress. 
Similarly, non-lethal aggressors are present in cases of so-called ‘bloodless invasion’, in which the invader’s 
aims only involve imposing non-lethal harms on their victims, such as territorial annexation and political 
repression (lethal force will only be employed if resistance is met.) Admittedly, the case of special 
relationships does not generalise so straightforwardly (though it would still clearly hold in cases where one 
family member attacks several others). But it may still plausibly apply in cases of intra-state violence, where 
oppressors and oppressed are often specially related to one another, albeit by non-familial bonds. So, even 
if victim refusal is only morally effective when these factors are in play, this does not significantly restrict the 
practical application of the consent-requirement, nor make the search for an aggregation principle any less 
pressing. 
22 Lazar, ‘Authorisation and the Morality of War’, 216-218. 
23 Ibid., p.217. Lazar accepts that something like the consent requirement may apply in a limited range of 
cases, in which killing is justified on the basis of agent-relative reasons, such as those grounded in special 
relationships. However, the existence of these justifications is highly contested.  
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However, this isn’t a convincing argument, for three reasons. First, the view that 
it is impermissible to defend victims against their will need not rest on the claim that their 
refusal “negates the agent-neutral value of saving their life”, as Lazar puts it.24 Rather, the 
most natural interpretation of the idea is that refusal generates a new moral consideration 
against defending them that defeats the agent-neutral, welfare-based reasons in favour.25  
Second, there is simply no connection between an individual’s continued life being 
agent-neutrally valuable and the question of whether that can veto defence. At base, the 
agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction concerns the scope of moral reasons; it is about 
whether or not a reason makes “some essential reference to the agent to whom they 
apply.”26 But formally classifying a reason as neutral or relative has no bearing on the 
substantive question of what other considerations – such as individuals’ self-regarding 
choices – are able to defeat that reason. And that is the question at stake here. To illustrate: 
works of art may well have significant agent-neutral value, but this fact does not undermine 
the art owner’s right to decide what happens to it.27 
Third, and most importantly, the argument from agent-neutrality has extremely 
counter-intuitive implications when applied to other cases. Consider the following 
example, familiar from the medical ethics literature: 
 
Patient: Patient is ill and will die unless he receives a blood transfusion. 
Doctor can give the transfusion easily and safely. However, Patient explicitly 
and competently refuses medical intervention because having the treatment 
would go against his deep religious commitments.  
 
Doctor would clearly act impermissibly if she gave Patient the transfusion against his will. 
This would be a paradigmatic case of wrongful paternalism.28 But Patient shares some 
important features with Elevator 1. In each case, (i) a series of events will result in an 
individual’s death unless prevented, (ii) the individual’s continued life is agent-neutrally 
valuable, and (iii) the individual refuses third-party intervention that will save their life. If, 
																																																						
24 Ibid., p.218. 
25 The notion of defeat here covers cases in which one reason outweighs another, as well as cases in which one 
reason defeats another by some other mechanism, such as by exclusion or cancellation. For this usage, see John 
Gardner and Timothy Macklem, ‘Reasons’, in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 440-475, at pp.463-464. 
26 Ibid., citing David McNaughton and Piers Rawling’s influential formulation of the distinction. David 
McNaughton and Piers Rawling, ‘Value and Agent-Relative Reasons’, Utilitas 7, No.1 (1995), 31-47. 
27 Thanks to an anonymous associate editor for this example. 
28 Revealingly, even defenders of ‘hard’ paternalism such as Danny Scoccia take it to be a serious objection 
to their view if it permitted interference in cases like this. Scoccia, ‘The Right to Autonomy and the 
Justification of Hard Paternalism’, at p.90. 
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as Lazar claims, the agent-neutral value of continued life ensures the permissibility of 
intervention in cases like Elevator 1, even in the face of competent refusal, then intervention 
should also be permissible in Patient (provided that it would better promote Patient’s welfare 
than not intervening). In fact, intervention should be much easier to justify in Patient than 
in Elevator 1 in one important respect: it doesn’t involve intentional killing! Yet this is clearly 
the wrong result. More generally, the argument from agent-neutrality seems to entail the 
extreme conclusion that interference with individuals’ choices is permitted whenever doing 
so overall promotes their wellbeing. Reflection on cases like Patient thus provides an 
additional source of support for the consent requirement.29  
I will postpone a deeper discussion of the consent requirement and its justification 
until Section 4. The points made so far are intended to demonstrate the initial plausibility 
of the requirement in single-victim cases, and thereby motivate the question of whether, 
and to what extent, the requirement constrains defence when multiple victims are 
threatened.  
 
3. Scepticism About Consent in Multiple-Victim Cases 
 
The dominant view among theorists who have considered these cases is that consent 
imposes little, if any, independent constraint on defensive harm. This scepticism is typically 
defended in opposition to a natural proposal (often made in discussions of humanitarian 
intervention and the use of force by non-state actors30) which calls for a majoritarian 
aggregation principle. More specifically: 
 
																																																						
29 One might try to resist this claim by pointing to differences between cases like Patient and Elevator 1. For 
example, one might argue that Elevator 1 involves preventing injustice whereas Patient only involves preventing 
misfortune. In Section 4 I consider a variation on the case in which Patient is ill due to being poisoned by an 
aggressor. Since intervention remains intuitively impermissible in this case, it doesn’t look like the 
injustice/misfortune distinction makes a difference to whether individuals may veto third-party intervention. 
Alternatively, one might argue that it makes a difference that intervention in Patient, but not in Elevator 1, 
involves violating an independent claim of the beneficiary’s, such as rights to bodily integrity or property. 
However, this move implausibly makes big differences in permissibility turn on minor differences between 
cases. For example, if the force of the consent-requirement is limited to cases involving independent rights 
violations, this implies that intervention would be permissible in Elevator 1, yet impermissible in slight 
variations on the case in which defending Victim requires Rescuer to scratch Victim’s arm (thereby violating 
his right to bodily integrity), or use Victim’s sniper rifle (thereby violating his property rights).  
30 See, for example, Miller, ‘Respectable Oppressors, Hypocritical Liberators: Morality, Intervention, and 
Reality’, p.224. Eliav Lieblich, Christopher Finlay, Michael Gross, and Lionel MacPherson each understand 
the requirement in terms of a belligerent agent being ‘representative’ of the group they claim to defend. Some 
form of majoritarianism is a natural (though not unique) interpretation of this idea, and many of the examples 
these authors use suggest they have something like this in mind. Lieblich, International Law and Civil War, 
p.256; Finlay, ‘Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence’; MacPherson, ‘Is Terrorism Distinctively 
Wrong?’; Gross, The Ethics of Insurgency, pp.37-44. 
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The Majority Consent Requirement: Other-defence is morally justified only if a 
majority (or super-majority) of the members of the victim group consent to defensive 
intervention (or do not validly refuse).31 
 
This view has obvious appeal. After all, few dispute that democracy is a good thing. In 
many contexts majority rule seems the appropriate way of deciding how to proceed given 
disagreement. The problem, however, is that when it comes to defending basic interests – 
such as life and limb – the majoritarian proposal is far from intuitive. To demonstrate, 
consider the following case, based on an example of Andrew Altman and Christopher 
Heath Wellman’s32: 
 
Elevator 2: Five Victims are taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to 
saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victims and wishes them dead. 
Rescuer is walking by and is able to shoot Aggressor with her sniper rifle, 
thereby saving the Victims. However, while one Victim consents to Defender’s 
intervention, the four remaining Victims refuse because of their deep 
commitment to non-violence.  
 
Here defence seems clearly permissible, despite the fact that 80% of the victims explicitly 
refuse. Moreover, the intuition persists even if we specify that the victims share a special 
relationship, such as family membership. These verdicts track the powerful idea that 
individuals’ basic interests place limits on majority rule.33 When these interests are 
threatened, individuals may have the right to decide for themselves whether they are defended, 
but not to decide for others.34 As Altman and Wellman put it, “It seems dubious to hold 
that a group has this type of normative dominion over its members.”35 As in the case of 
Elevator 1, the value of individual sovereignty seems to ground the intuitive verdict. 
																																																						
31 For discussion of several distinct majoritarian proposals, albeit in the context of non-defensive 
interventions, see Kalle Grill, ‘Liberalism, Altruism, and Group Consent’, Public Health Ethics 2, No.2 (2009), 
146-157. 
32 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: 
Human Rights and Political Violence’, Ethics 118, No.2 (2009), 228-257, at p.244. 
33 For a classic articulation, see Brian Barry, ‘Is Democracy Special’, in Peter Laslett and James Fishkin (ed) 
Philosophy, Politics and Society: Fifth Series (Yale University Press, 1979), 155-196, at pp.170-171. 
34 This leaves open the possibility that when other kinds of interests are threatened a majoritarian consent 
requirement could be appropriate. For discussion, see [Reference Removed].  
35 Altman and Wellman, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination’, p.243. For similar arguments, 
see McMahan, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality’, p.52; Helen Frowe, ‘Judging 
Armed Humanitarian Intervention’, in Don E. Scheid (ed), The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 93-110 at pp.108-109; Tesón, ‘The Liberal Case for 
Humanitarian Intervention’, p.106. 
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We can draw two sceptical conclusions from cases like Elevator 2, one stronger than 
the other. The weaker conclusion is that majoritarian aggregation principles are false: it is 
not true that the consent (or non-refusal) of the majority is a necessary condition for 
permissibly defending groups of victims from serious threats. However, sceptics about the 
consent-requirement go further than this, and endorse the stronger conclusion that refusal 
can only render defence impermissible when it is unanimous among the members of the 
victim group. To support this view, consider variations on Elevator 2, in which increasing 
numbers of refusing victims are present in the elevator. It still seems clear (at least to me) 
that defence would be permissible even if the refusers greatly outnumber the single 
consenter.36 Putting things more precisely, we can interpret the sceptics as proposing the 
following, extremely weak, aggregation principle: 
 
The Minimal Consent Requirement: Other-defence is morally justified only if some 
member(s) of the victim group consent(s) to defensive intervention (or do not validly 
refuse.) 
 
On this view, while the consent requirement applies in principle in multiple-victim cases, 
there will be practically no instances in which a lack of consent in fact renders defence 
unjustified.37 This has important practical implications. For example, if a military 
humanitarian intervention meets all the standard conditions of just war (just cause, 
proportionality, last resort, etc.) then even very widespread refusal among the victim 
population cannot itself render the intervention impermissible. As Jeff McMahan, one of 
the chief consent-sceptics, puts it: 
 
“that the familiar principles of jus ad bellum, and especially the proportionality 
condition, do all the substantive work that the requirement of consent is 
supposed to do is largely correct as an account of the conditions of objectively 
justified humanitarian intervention.”38  
																																																						
36 Fabre suggests that she also shares the sceptical view, noting that in a diachronic multiple-victim case, an 
individual victim’s refusal “would not carry much weight if any”. ‘Fabre, Permissible Rescue Killings’, n.11.  
37 As McMahan and Frowe each point out, in moderately large victim groups there will be invariably be 
members who are not capable of valid refusal, such as young children. Hence, the Minimal Consent 
Requirement is likely to be met even in cases where every victim explicitly refuses.  McMahan, ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality’, p.53. Frowe, ‘Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention’, 
p.109. 
38 McMahan, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality’, p.52. Frowe similarly concludes 
that “we should not include consent as a separate component of justification for intervention.” Frowe, 
‘Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention’, p.109. 
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And, more strongly: 
 
“[consent] has no role among the conditions of objective justification in ideal 
theory”39 
 
This is consistent with consent playing an important derivative role in justifying other-
defence. For example, widespread refusal may provide good evidence that defence would 
not be justified on some other ground, or render intervention unlikely to succeed (for 
example, because success requires the cooperation of the victims).40 The sceptics’ position 
is that consent imposes only a trivial independent constraint on intervention in multiple-
victim cases. 
 
4. In Defence of Consent  
 
In what follows I provide a defence of the consent requirement against this scepticism. As 
my starting points, I accept the intuitive verdicts in both Elevator 1 and Elevator 2 and the 
sceptics’ rejection of the Majority Consent Requirement. I also accept the deeper 
liberal/individualist picture of morality that underpins – either explicitly or implicitly – the 
sceptical position. But I will deny the Minimal Consent Requirement follows from these 
judgements. Instead, we should endorse a much stronger aggregation principle, according 
to which defending a group can be impermissible in virtue of a single victim refusing 
defensive intervention. 
 
4.1 The power to control one’s good 
I start by providing a deeper moral basis for the consent requirement, that provides a 
unified explanation of the contrasting verdicts in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2.   
Here is the basic idea. When it comes to our bodies and property, each of us has 
the moral power to exclude others from using them, simply because they are ours and we 
																																																						
39 Ibid., p.53. McMahan does concede that consent may matter under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. I 
will not consider this idea here, since my aim is to provide a defence of the consent requirement at the 
objective or ‘fact-relative’ level. 
40 Altman and Wellman, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination’, pp.244-245; Allen Buchanan, 
‘The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the Ethics of Intervention’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 
41, No.4 (2013), 292-323; Pattison, ‘Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention’, pp.580-583; 
Benbaji, ‘Legitimate Authority in War’. 
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are in charge of them. Others may only use our material resources if we authorise them to 
do so and we are wronged if they do so without our consent, even if they improve those 
resources by using them.41 My contention is that, in addition to these more prosaic rights, 
each of has structurally similar powers of control regarding whether, and for what 
purposes, others may use our good. One person uses another’s good when she justifies her 
actions by appeal to the fact that it will promote the other’s welfare. On this view, reasons 
pertaining to an individual’s good can be thought of as a kind of resource – a moral 
resource. And just as I can exclude you from using my body or property by withholding 
my consent, I have the power to prevent you from justifying your actions by appealing to 
the fact that you will benefit me, by repudiating those benefits. By exercising this power, I 
render my good morally inadmissible for the purposes of justifying your action, and you 
commit a form of trespass against me if you attempt to do so. For want of a convenient 
label, term this normative ability the Power of Prudential Exclusion (PPE).42 An important 
upshot of the PPE is that individuals can, by controlling access to justifying reasons, render 
actions impermissible that would otherwise be justified. As I will explain below, it is this 
consequence of our self-regarding powers that gives the consent requirement its moral 
foundations. 
But some further work needs to be done first. What I have said so far simply sets 
out the structural features of the PPE. But why should we think that individuals have this 
power? And what grounds or justifies it? 
In my view, the most compelling evidence for the PPE comes from noting the 
central role it plays – either explicitly or implicitly – in prominent accounts of paternalism’s 
distinctive wrongness, as well as in explaining judgements about particular cases.43 I will 
not attempt to offer a definition of paternalism.44 Instead, I will (rather roughly) take 
																																																						
41 For a helpful discussion of ‘use-based-wrongs’, see Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs, (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2016), Ch.2. 
42 While preparing the final version of this paper, I became aware of a very similar proposal defended in 
unpublished work by Seth Lazar. Lazar also argues that your rights of self-ownership extend to your interests, 
and that one important upshot of these rights is that “whether those interests count for or against some 
action is, at least in part, to be determined by your choice.” However, Lazar deploys this idea for different 
purpose to mine. Whereas I focus on the implications of our rights over our good for how others may 
permissibly act, Lazar is concerned with how these rights affect the deontic status of our own actions. In 
particular, Lazar argues that these ownership rights ground agent-centred options to favour and sacrifice 
one’s own interests, even when doing so does not promote aggregate wellbeing. Seth Lazar, ‘Self-Ownership 
and Agent-Centred Options’ (unpublished manuscript). I briefly discuss some of Lazar’s arguments for the 
general right below. 
43 If Lazar is correct that positing the right to control how one’s interests may be used grounds central 
features of commonsense morality, then this provides another source of support for something like the PPE.   
44 For a detailed overview of debates regarding the definition of paternalism, see Gerald Dworkin, ‘Defining 
Paternalism’ in Christian Coons and Michael Weber (eds), Paternalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
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central cases of paternalism to involve: (i) Some form of interference with an individual, 
(ii) that is carried out against her will, and (iii) for the sake of her own good. On a fairly 
standard conception, paternalism is wrong (when it’s wrong) because the paternalisee’s 
autonomy has priority over considerations of her wellbeing or good. The question is how 
to characterise this priority. According to one influential view, we should understand it in 
terms of competent individuals having authority with respect to their good.45 When it comes 
to matters concerning her own welfare, the individual is ‘the boss’ and her will settles the 
question of whether others may act to promote her good. The paternalistic wrong lies in 
denying individuals rightful authority over themselves. By contrast, paternalism may be 
permissible when one’s self-regarding authority is compromised in some way (for example, 
due to duress, deception, or lack of capacity). 
I think proponents of authority-accounts of paternalism are appealing to 
something very similar to the PPE. This is made explicit in Daniel Groll’s recent 
articulation of the view. For Groll, my having authority with respect to my good consists 
in having the normative power to give others exclusionary reasons: that is, second order-
reasons not to act for certain first-order reasons.46 My self-regarding choice “is meant to 
supplant the reason-giving force of other considerations not because it outweighs those 
other considerations but because it is meant to silence or exclude those other 
considerations.”47 Chief among the excluded reasons are those grounded in the fact that 
treating me contrary to my will is likely to promote my welfare. We need not endorse 
Groll’s specific exclusionary-reasons treatment of authority in order to appreciate its 
affinities with the PPE. The key point is that, as a result of exercising my will, certain 
reasons – those pertaining to my good or welfare – no longer contribute to justifying 
others’ actions. We can remain neutral on whether the relevant normative mechanism is 
																																																						
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 25-38. See also, Emma C. Bullock. ‘A Normatively Neutral Definition 
of Paternalism’, Philosophical Quarterly 65, No.258 (2015), 1-21. 
45 This view has been developed most thoroughly by Seana Shiffrin and Daniel Groll, but it seems implicit 
in many discussions of paternalism. On Shiffrin view, many paradigmatic cases of paternalism involve “a 
person’s aiming to take over or control what is properly within the agent’s own legitimate domain of 
judgement or action.” (‘Paternalism, Unconscionability, and Accommodation’, p216). On Groll’s view, a 
competent individual is the “de jure ultimate decision-maker” with respect to matters that concern her good 
(‘Paternalism, Respect, and the Will’, Ethics 122, No.4 (2012), 692-720, at p.700). For another endorsement, 
see Cholbi, ‘Paternalism and Our Rational Powers’ Mind 126, No.501 (2017), 123-153. Joel Feinberg’s 
treatment of how paternalism violates autonomy also suggests he is an advocate of the authority-view (see, 
for example, Feinberg, Harm to Self, p.52).  
46 For seminal discussion, see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). David Enoch also places the notion of an exclusionary reason at the heart of his account of the 
wrong of paternalism. David Enoch, ‘What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116, No.1 (2016), 21-48. 
47 Groll, ‘Paternalism, Respect, and the Will’, p.701. 
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best cashed out in terms of exclusion, cancelation, silencing, nullification, invalidation, or 
some other notion. 
An important virtue of authority-accounts of paternalism – and therefore the PPE 
– is that they enable us to explain the intuitive difference between cases like the following48: 
	
Medicine 1: Bob is ill and will die unless he takes some medicine that is delivered 
via a gas. However, he competently refuses medical treatment because the 
medicine contains a substance that his religious convictions prohibit ingesting. 
Doctor pumps the gas into Bob’s hospital room in order to save his life. Bob 
breaths the gas. 
 
Medicine 2: Dave is ill and will imminently develop a lifelong debilitating 
condition unless he takes some medicine that is delivered via a gas. He consents 
to Doctor giving him the medicine. However, due to time constraints, the only 
way to treat him is to immediately pump the gas into Dave’s hospital ward. Bob 
is the hospital bed next to Dave recovering from a slipped disc, which has 
rendered him immobile. Bob refuses to be given the medicine because the 
medicine contains a substance that his religious convictions prohibit ingesting. 
The cost to Bob of breathing the gas is sufficiently high that he is not under a 
duty to bear it in order to save Dave the cost of the debilitating disease. Doctor 
pumps the gas into the ward in order to save Dave from the debilitating 
condition. Both Bob and Dave breath the gas. 
 
I assume it would clearly be wrongfully paternalistic for Doctor to force Bob to consume 
the gas against his will in Medicine 1 (this is simply the Patient case with slightly different 
apparatus). In Medicine 2, by contrast, it would not be paternalistic, and may well be morally 
permissible for Doctor to do so (at very least, there seems to be a significant moral 
difference between the two cases). This comparison reveals, interestingly, that it can be 
permissible to transgress an individual’s rights to autonomy and bodily integrity in order 
to promote the good (preventing the harm of a debilitating disease), yet impermissible to 
violate those very same rights in order bring about a greater good (preventing the harm of 
death). The PPE neatly explains how this can be so. What matters is not simply how much 
wellbeing is promoted, but whose wellbeing it is and whether they have exercised their 
powers of control over it. While we may not transgress Bob’s rights for the sake of Bob’s 
good (because he has excluded us from appealing to those reasons), we may do so for the 
sake of Dave’s lesser good because those reasons remain ‘in play’ and may be sufficient to 
justifying overriding Bob’s rights as the lesser-evil. 
																																																						
48 For a range of other cases in which authority-accounts are well-placed to capture important distinctions, 
see Groll, ‘Paternalism, Respect, and the Will’. 
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Moving on to the justification of the PPE. I believe the PPE can be grounded in a 
plurality of considerations. A complete account of these factors is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Instead, let me briefly sketch five promising candidates. 
First, and most obviously, the PPE responds to the fact that we are intimately and 
uniquely connected to our own good, perhaps even more so than our own bodies. As Seth 
Lazar argues, we are not only affected by the satisfaction and frustration of our interests 
as no one else can be, they also play a central role in constituting our identity: there is a 
sense in which we just are our interests.49 Given the degree to which we are enmeshed with 
our own wellbeing, it seems fitting that we have rights to control how others may use it, 
just as we have rights over what others may do with our bodies.  
Second, the PPE serves our interest in autonomy, in at least two ways. First, our 
having the ability to prevent others from acting to promote our good enhances our ability 
to shape our lives in accordance with values and projects that we endorse (autonomy as 
self-determination or authenticity). Second, by giving us control over the reasons for which 
others may act, the PPE protects our interest in not being controlled by others (autonomy 
as independence). In each case, the PPE increases the degree to which what happens to us 
depends on our choices.50 
Third, we plausibly have interests in being able to restrict access to our good 
independently of whether it helps us control others’ behaviour. Common-sense morality 
contains a stringent constraint on using others for the sake of goals they don’t share.51 
What counts as using persons is typically taken to cover using their bodies and property. 
However, given the intimate connection between one’s self and one’s good, it seems 
reasonable to include the use of another’s good within the scope of the constraint. The 
PPE is thus valuable because it gives us a measure of protection against being wrongfully 
used as an end in this way. In cases where I don’t endorse others’ plans to benefit me, this 
power enables me to morally divest myself from those plans, and prevent my good from 
justifying goals that I do not share. The PPE thus serves an interest in having normative 
control over the reasons that others may act on, separate from our interests in de facto 
control over what others do.52 
																																																						
49 Lazar, ‘Self-Ownership and Agent-Centred Options’. 
50 On these two dimensions of autonomy, and how they can come apart, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
‘Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Permanently Demented’, in Justine Burley (ed), Dworkin and His Critics 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 195-217. See also Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes, Chs.8&11. 
51 See, for example, Warren Quinn, ‘Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and 
Allowing’, The Philosophical Review 98. No.3 (1989), 287-312. 
52 On normative interests, see David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
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Fourth, the PPE can be justified by appeal to the valuable relationships that it 
makes possible. By having the power to control access to my good, I am able to pick out 
certain persons as those who can treat me benevolently without violating a duty. This 
permission enables a form of intimacy and exclusivity that is integral to creating and 
sustaining many kinds of valuable relationship, such as those between friends and family 
members, and between care-givers and those cared for. Were we to lack the PPE, and our 
good were accessible to all, this valuable intimacy would not be possible.53  
Fifth, the PPE may not only serve our interests, but also partly constitute our moral 
status. According to a familiar strain of non-consequentialist thought, persons have value 
as ends in themselves, and not just in virtue of their amount of wellbeing their lives contain. 
Were we to matter only in the latter sense, we would be mere ‘receptacles’ of value and 
morality would permit imposing costs on us for the sake of net gains in aggregate 
wellbeing. In order to properly reflect the fundamental independence of persons, morality 
must contain constraints on promoting the good (such as rights against harm).54 
However, incorporating constraints only partly responds to the separateness-of-
persons/value-receptacle worry. In addition, we need something like the PPE. To help see 
this, recall the Medicine 1 and Medicine 2 cases discussed above. In each case, Bob is equally 
protected from being sacrificed for the sake of the greater good: he has (non-absolute) 
rights that others not infringe his autonomy and bodily integrity. In this respect, morality 
accommodates Bob’s unique perspective with respect to his own life and projects. But 
under a moral system that lacked the PPE, there would be no deep difference between 
infringing Bob’s rights for the sake of the greater good when the good is constituted by Bob’s 
wellbeing (as in Medicine 1) and when it is constituted by someone else’s (as in Medicine 2). Bob would 
be treated as an interchangeable container of value, in precisely the manner ruled out by a 
concern for the separateness-of-persons.55 Our moral status thus grounds the PPE. 
 
4.2 Explaining the verdict in Elevator 1 
																																																						
53 This is just a snapshot of a more general form of argument developed in great depth in Owens, Shaping the 
Normative Landscape. See also Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes, Ch.11 for helpful discussion. 
54 On this point, see Thomas Nagel, ‘Personal Rights and Public Space’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, No.2 
(1995), 83-107; Frances Kamm, ‘Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End in Itself, and the Significance 
of Status’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 21, No.4 (1992), 354-389. 
55
I am thus in agreement with Michael Cholbi’s suggestion that refraining from paternalism “seems to consist 
in honoring boundaries between persons”. Michael Cholbi, ‘Paternalism and Our Rational Powers’, Mind 
126, No.501 (2017), 123-153, at p.145.  
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With the positive case for the PPE now in place, we can now return to the consent 
requirement. The idea that individuals have a power of exclusion over their good provides 
a deeper explanation of the intuitive verdict in Elevator 1.  
Though it is often overlooked, the justification for defensively killing aggressors 
has two basic parts. Firstly, and most obviously, we appeal to the aggressor’s liability. 
Liability functions negatively in the justification, by removing the normal constraint on 
intentional killing. But this is not sufficient to justify killing the aggressor. To say that 
someone is liable to defensive killing is just to say they would not be wronged by being 
killed for a particular defensive purpose (that they lack a claim-right against such 
treatment.) But the fact that an action would not wrong someone does not generate any 
positive reason to perform it, and we still have weighty moral reasons not to kill even liable 
individuals. Put simply: liable persons are still persons, whose lives and interests matter 
morally. Our duties of beneficence require us to give these facts considerable weight in our 
deliberations.56 To see this, consider the intuitive constraints on defensive harm 
encapsulated in the requirement of necessity. If a victim can avoid being killed by a culpable 
aggressor by retreating at very little cost, or can avoid being killed by a gang of culpable 
aggressors by killing one aggressor rather than all, then they are morally required to take 
the least harmful option. Since, by hypothesis, the aggressors are all fully liable to defensive 
killing, this common-sense constraint shows that there are significant moral reasons against 
killing liable persons.  
The justification for killing aggressors thus requires a second component, which 
identifies a positive moral reason in favour of killing. This reason is straightforward: killing 
the aggressor is necessary to protect the continued life and wellbeing of the victim. The 
obviousness of this explains why we tend to treat the justification for killing aggressors as 
exhausted by considerations of liability.  
Once we recognise this additional welfarist component, we can see more precisely 
why defensively killing aggressors in cases like Elevator 1 is impermissible. Victim’s refusal 
prevents the welfarist component of the justification for defensive killing from being 
satisfied. By exercising his power of exclusion, Victim prevents a class of reasons from 
																																																						
56 For elaboration on these sorts of reasons, see Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong, ‘Necessity, Moral 
Liability, and Defensive Harm’, Law and Philosophy 31, No.6 (2012), 673-701. See also, David Rodin, ‘The 
Lesser Evil Obligation’, in Saba Bazargan-Forward and Samuel C. Rickless (eds), The Ethics of War: Essays 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 28-45; Michele Madden Dempsey, ‘Against Liability: A Reason-
Based Account of Self-Defense’, in Christian Coons and Michael Weber (eds), The Ethics of Self-Defense 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 211-232; Adil Ahmed Haque, Law and Morality at War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), p.120. 
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contributing to the justification of killing Aggressor: those grounded in the fact that he 
would be benefitted. As a result, there is insufficient admissible moral reason that Rescuer 
can invoke to justify defending Victim. Rescuer thus both lacks a justification for killing 
Aggressor and commits an additional paternalist wrong against Victim if they do so, by 
using a moral resource that Victim has authoritatively declared may not be used for that 
purpose. 
One might object that this justification of the consent requirement is undermined 
by a familiar argument from more general debates about the permissibility of paternalism.57 
When confronted with a putatively paternalistic policy that seems both sensible and 
desirable, a common move in the anti-paternalist’s repertoire is to argue that the policy can 
in fact be supported by non-paternalistic reasons.58 For example, Seana Shiffrin famously 
argues that the state need not act paternalistically if it refuses to enforce contracts it deems 
to be exploitative or deeply unfair, because it need not be guided by the aim of protecting 
individuals from the harmful consequences of their voluntary choices. Instead, the state 
may permissibly refuse because it has a legitimate interest in avoiding complicity in 
exploitation.59  
A structurally similar line of argument may be advanced against my defence of the 
consent requirement. On this view, Rescuer need not act paternalistically by defending 
Victim in Elevator 1 because there are alternative reasons that support killing Aggressor 
besides promoting Victims good, and Rescuer may be acting solely for those reasons. Most 
obviously, Rescuer may be guided by the aim of preventing a serious injustice. Hence, we 
can grant victims the right to exclude rescuers from acting for their good, but deny that 
exercising this power renders other-defence impermissible. 
In response, the first thing to note is that this objection relies on the assumption 
that victims of aggression lack control over the justice-based reasons for harming 
aggressors. But this assumption can be contested. As Cécile Fabre has argued in response 
to a similar objection, “it is not enough to ensure that justice obtains; one must also ensure 
that the right person [the victim] decides whether or not to bring about justice.”60 If Fabre 
is right that justice is sensitive to victims’ preferences in this way, then the appeal to justice-
based reasons for harming need not undermine the consent requirement. At very least, the 
																																																						
57 Thanks to an anonymous editor for pressing me to consider this objection. 
58 Peter de Marneffe labels this ‘the reconciliation strategy’. Peter de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’. 
59 Shiffrin, ‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation’. 
60 Fabre, ‘Permissible Rescue Killings’, p.159. My parenthesis. 
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objector owes us an argument for why justice is preference-independent in the relevant 
sense. In what follows I will assume that such an argument can be given. 
I grant that the objection may well succeed in showing that defending victims 
against their will does not always involve acting paternalistically. It seems plausible that 
paternalistic wronging requires being motivated by the paternalisee’s good, and Rescuers 
need not have that motivation. However, I highly doubt that it shows that defending 
victims against their will is morally justified. And this is what needs to be demonstrated in 
order to challenge my account of the consent requirement. The crucial point is that, on my 
view, the impermissibility of defending Victim is not explained by his being paternalistically 
wronged. Rather, it is explained by the fact that Victim – by exercising his PPE – prevents 
Rescuer from having a justifying reason for killing Aggressor (that Victim’s good will be 
promoted). So, even if Rescuer is not motivated by Victim’s good – and therefore does 
not paternalistically wrong him – she does not thereby acquire a justification for killing 
Aggressor, since Victim’s good remains inadmissible. So, in order to show that Rescuer is 
justified in defending Victim, it is not enough to identify some alternative reasons for 
killing Aggressor, such as preventing injustice. It must also be shown, much more strongly, 
that those reasons are sufficient to justify intentionally killing Aggressor, independently of 
considerations of Victim’s welfare.  
While we may agree with Shiffrin that our reasons to avoid complicity in 
exploitation may be sufficiently important to justify failing to enforce an unfair contract, it 
seems implausible that our reasons to prevent injustice could be weighty enough to justify 
killing, even if the target is liable. Persons’ lives and welfare matter a great deal, 
independently of whether those interests are protected by rights. This seems especially 
clear in cases where the aggressor is not fully culpable. My suspicion is that whatever 
intuitive force this idea has comes from the fact that preventing serious injustice and 
promoting welfare are typically practically inseparable. But the objection under 
consideration requires that preventing abstract, impersonal injustice itself is sufficient to 
justify killing, even if it were not good for anyone. That is a pretty extreme view. 
To help see the relative weakness of justice-based reasons in life-or-death contexts, 
consider the following example: 
 
Rock Rescue: Betty is taking a walk at the bottom of some cliffs, when she 
spots two rocks falling from the cliff tops. The first rock has been blown by 
the wind and will land on two innocent persons, killing one and breaking the 
other’s leg. The second rock has been deliberately pushed Villain and will kill 
	 23	
a third innocent person. Luckily, Betty has her ray gun with her and has time 
to vaporise one rock before it lands, but not both. 61 
 
If our reasons to prevent injustice were weighty enough to justify killing, then we should 
expect to judge that Betty ought to vaporise the second rock and prevent the murder. But 
it seems clear that instead she ought to vaporise the first rock and prevent the moderately 
greater harm.62 As Jeff McMahan puts it, “it would be perverse to prevent the murder 
rather than the accidental death together with the nonlethal injury.”63 Moreover, even if 
each boulder only threatened a single life, it is still not obvious that preventing injustice 
would be important enough justify vaporising the second rock, rather than tossing a coin 
and giving each victim an equal chance of survival.64 If our reasons to prevent injustice 
yield so easily to considerations of welfare and fairness, this strongly suggests that they are 
insufficiently weighty to justify killing. The justification for preventing unjust aggression is 
largely grounded in the importance of preventing harm, rather than preventing wrongs.65 
We can cast further doubt on the significance of preventing injustice by considering 
a variation on the Patient case discussed earlier: 
 
Poisoned Patient: Patient has been poisoned by a malicious enemy, and will 
die unless he receives a blood transfusion. However, Patient explicitly and 
competently refuses medical intervention because having the treatment would 
go against his deep religious commitments. Doctor can give the transfusion 
easily, safely, and without Patient ever knowing. 
 
In the original Patient case, it would be straightforwardly impermissible for Doctor to treat 
Patient against his will, as well as clearly paternalistic (since Doctor would justify his actions 
																																																						
61 Based on a case discussed, independently, by Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer, who draw very similar 
conclusions. McMahan, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality’, p.60; Peter Singer, 
‘Bystanders to Poverty’, in N. Ann Davis, Richard Kershen, and Jeff McMahan (eds), Ethics and Humanity: 
Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 187-201 at pp.195-198. 
62 Frances Kamm agrees with the verdict in this type of case, but reports the intuition that preventing lesser 
unjust harms may be permissible in cases where one would prevent the unjust act and not just its harmful 
effects. However, this has the rather counterintuitive implication that the permissibility of Betty’s choice in 
Rock Rescue depends on whether she also has the option of preventing the second boulder from hitting its 
target by vaporising the stick that Villain would otherwise use to perform the act of pushing the rock off the 
cliff. Frances Kamm, ‘Self-Defence, Resistance, and Suicide’, in Helen Frowe and Gerald Lang (eds), How 
We Fight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 75-86, at pp.75-76. 
63 McMahan, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality’, p.60. 
64 Derek Parfit, Victor Tadros, Liam Murphy, and Kieran Oberman also endorse the view that preventing 
injustice makes little or no difference in cases of equal harm. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), p.48; Tadros The Ends of Harm, pp.105-106; Tadros Wrongs and Crimes, pp. 
162-166; Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
pp.126-127; Kieran Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’ (unpublished manuscript). 
65 See Tadros, The Ends of Harm, p.106. 
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by appeal to Patient’s good). In Poisoned Patient, by contrast, Doctor can appeal to the aim 
of preventing a serious injustice. But this doesn’t seem to make the intervention much 
easier to justify (even if it absolves Doctor of the charge of paternalism).66 But if reasons 
to prevent injustice are insufficient to affect permissibility of saving a life against the 
beneficiary’s will, it is hard to believe that they are important enough to justify killing in 
contravention of the beneficiary’s wishes, even if the target is liable. 
There are, however, a limited class of cases in which non-victim-centric reasons 
may be sufficient to justify harming aggressors, and so permit third-parties to defend 
victims even in the face of valid refusal. These are cases in which a serious threat to a 
victim can be averted by imposing a relatively minor harm on the aggressor. 67 For example, 
if a rescuer can prevent an aggressor from killing her victim by spraining the aggressor’s 
wrist, then it doesn’t seem implausible that this harm could be justified by appeal to the 
value of preventing serious injustice, or even the benefit to the aggressor of not committing 
a serious moral wrong.68 If so, then spraining the aggressor’s wrist may be permissible even 
if the victim validly refuses defensive intervention, since the justification would not require 
appealing to the victim’s good. Since it would be a troubling implication of the consent-
requirement if it prohibited imposing minor defensive harms on lethal aggressors, I take it 
to be a virtue of my account that it gives a principled rationale for why there might plausibly 
be an exception in these cases.69  
 
4.3 Explaining the verdict in Elevator 2 
The PPE also neatly accounts for the intuitive judgement in cases like Elevator 2. In 
assessing this case, I propose that we proceed by composition, treating each of the five 
victims in the same way that we treat the single victim in Elevator 1. This is in line with the 
broadly liberal/individualist moral outlook endorsed by consent sceptics. The basic 
																																																						
66 I should acknowledge that an anonymous associate editor reports having a less clear intuition about the 
wrongness of intervention in Poisoned Patient.  
67 Thanks to an anonymous associate editor for pressing me to consider these cases. 
68 For a detailed discussion of how aggressor-centric reasons may contribute to the justification of defensive 
harm, see Kimberly Brownlee, ‘Acting Defensively for the Sake of Our Attacker’ (unpublished manuscript). 
69 Interestingly, the rationale for this exception may extend to certain cases of killing, depending on our views 
about how these justifications for harm grounded in preventing injustice aggregate. For example, imagine a 
case in which an aggressor threatens to kill 100 innocent victims, who each validly refuse defensive 
intervention. If we grant that a rescuer would be permitted to inflict a minor defensive harm on the aggressor 
in order to prevent the injustice of one murder, it is possible that the amount of harm it is permissible to 
inflict increases with each additional threatened murder, to the point at which it is permissible to kill the 
aggressor. Though I am open to this idea, its plausibility depends on resolving some extremely difficult issues 
concerning how harms and injustices aggregate, which I lack the space (and skill) to explore here. Thanks to 
an anonymous associate editor for raising this possibility. 
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thought is that the normative consequences that follow from each victim’s consent and 
refusal should not change simply because they are threatened in conjunction with others.70 
On this approach, each of the four refusing victims successfully exercises their normative 
power to make their good morally inadmissible for the purposes of justifying defence, just 
as the single victim does in Elevator 1.  All that changes between Elevator 1 and Elevator 2 is 
whether this exercise renders defence impermissible. It does not, due to an important 
feature of Elevator 2: each victim’s good is sufficient to justify the total defensive harm 
involved in defending the group (killing Aggressor). This explains the intuitive 
permissibility of defending the five victims, despite the fact that four refuse. Since the good 
of each victim is sufficient to justify the total defensive harm, and one victim consents, 
Rescuer has sufficient admissible moral reason to justify killing Aggressor. 
This account also shows that defending the five in Elevator 2 need not involve 
paternalistically wronging any victim. Though her action is not endorsed by four of the 
victims, her justification for defending them does not require making use of any victim’s 
moral resources without their permission (unlike in Elevator 1). It is not true of any victim 
that they are defended against their will, for the sake of their own good. Rescuer thus respects 
each victim’s sovereignty over their good.71 
 
4.4 Consent and Proportionality 
With the foregoing analysis of the two cases to hand, we are in a position to see why, contra 
the sceptics, the consent requirement imposes a significant constraint on defending 
groups. The key point is that there is a crucial difference between cases like Elevator 1 and 
Elevator 2, and multiple-victim cases more generally. This is that in many cases (including 
humanitarian interventions, rebellions, and wars of national-defence) defending victims 
not only involves harming aggressors (as in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2) but also causing 
serious harm to innocents.  
This is significant because, when there are these additional harms, it is not true (as 
in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2) that each individual victim’s good is sufficient to justify the 
																																																						
70 I will consider an important challenge to this assumption in Section 5. 
71 Allen Buchanan has recently argued that we should reject the consent requirement in multiple-victim cases, 
on the ground that basing the requirement in anti-paternalism would, implausibly, require unanimous 
consent. My account shows that this objection is mistaken. One does not treat others paternalistically simply 
by acting against their will, but by justifying one’s action by appeal to certain reasons: those pertaining to 
their good or welfare. Since, as I have argued, it is possible to justify defending non-consenting victims 
without appealing to their good, anti-paternalism does not require unanimous consent (or non-refusal). See 
Buchanan, ‘Self-Determination, Revolution, and Intervention’, n.10. and ‘The Ethics of Revolution and Its 
Implications for the Ethics of Intervention’, p.317. 
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total amount of harm that would be caused by defending them. Instead, when defence 
involves collateral killing the number of victims becomes highly morally relevant, due to 
considerations of proportionality.72 Putting aside some important complications, the 
proportionality requirement holds that the relevant goods achieved by a defensive action 
must be sufficient to outweigh the relevant bad effects that it causes.73 When those bad 
effects include killing innocent persons, defence is usually permissible only if it will prevent 
a significantly greater number of innocent people from being killed. In these cases, the 
rights of those collaterally killed are justifiably overridden as the ‘lesser-evil’.74 For example, 
judgements about the standard Trolley Case suggest that a 5:1 ratio between lives saved 
and innocents killed might be required. At the very least, it would not be proportionate to 
kill one innocent person as a side-effect in order to save one innocent person from being 
killed. 
Given the proportionality requirement on harming innocents, defensive actions 
that cause collateral harms are often impermissible, because disproportionate, in virtue of 
a lack of victims. My contention is that a lack of consenting victims (or, more accurately, a lack 
of non-refusing victims) can also render defence disproportionate, for precisely the same 
reason: defence would not achieve sufficient relevant goods to outweigh its relevant bad 
effects. Just as in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2 discussed above, the central idea is that when 
victims validly refuse defensive intervention, they thereby exclude their good from the 
pool of reasons that rescuers may appeal to in order to justify defending them. However, 
in cases where, unlike Elevator 1 and Elevator 2, the number of victims matters because 
defence involves killing innocents, the inadmissibility of these reasons may render 
defensive force disproportionate, depending on the specific facts of the case. If correct, 
this reveals the sceptical aggregation principle – the Minimal Consent Requirement – to be 
mistaken. There are many cases in which victims’ refusal can make it impermissible to 
defend a group, even if some (or even many) members explicitly consent to defensive 
intervention. 
 To illustrate this, consider a variation on Elevator 2 that involves collateral killing:  
																																																						
72 More precisely, I am concerned here with what Jeff McMahan calls the ‘wide’ proportionality constraint, 
which governs harms inflicted on non-liable persons. Harms to liable are governed by a ‘narrow’ 
proportionality constraint persons (at least up to certain point). See McMahan, Killing in War, pp.18-20. 
73 For a classic discussion, see Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 33, No.1 (2005), 34-66. 
74 As Helen Frowe explains: ‘Lesser-evil justifications obtain when one will prevent substantially more harm 
than one causes, such that the disparity between the harm and the good overrides the deontological 
presumption against causing harm’. Helen Frowe, ‘Claim Rights, Duties and Lesser-Evil Justifications’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89, No.1 (2015), 267–85, at p.274. 
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Elevator 3: Five Victims are taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to 
saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victims and wishes them dead. 
Rescuer is walking by and is able to kill Aggressor by throwing a grenade, 
thereby saving Victims. However, if she does so, the blast from the grenade 
will kill Bystander as a side-effect. While one Victim consents to Rescuer’s 
intervention, the four remaining Victims refuse because of their commitment 
to non-violence.  
 
In this case, I contend, it is impermissible for Rescuer to defend the five Victims, because 
doing so would be disproportionate. This is despite the fact that saving the five would be 
permissible, because proportionate, if each of the Victims consented (or did not refuse).75 
In essence, on my account, the four Victims’ refusal morally converts a case of collaterally 
killing one in order to save five into a case of collaterally killing one in order to save one. 
And saving a single life is not enough to justify killing one innocent person.  
Three features of my proposal are worth highlighting. First, on this view consent 
functions in the morality of defensive harm as an internal component of the broader 
proportionality requirement on harming innocent people. An individual’s consent (or non-
refusal) is required in order for benefits to that individual to count positively in the 
proportionality calculation. Second, the proposal is emphatically not majoritarian. What 
matters morally is the number of refusing victims, not the proportion of refusers within a 
victim group. Third, on this view, what counts as having sufficient consent to satisfy the 
consent requirement will vary on a case-by-case basis. This is because the amount of 
consent required in order to render defence proportionate will depend on contingent 
factors, chiefly (i) how large the group of beneficiaries is, (ii) how many victims validly 
refuse defensive intervention, and (iii) the extent to which innocents will be harmed in the 
course of defending the group. When the number of victims far exceeds the threshold at 
which causing a certain amount of harm to innocents would be proportionate, only a small 
proportion of victims need consent (or not validly refuse) in order to render it 
proportionate to cause that harm. But as the number is reduced, getting closer to that 
threshold, the proportion of victims that must consent correspondingly increases, 
potentially to the to the point at which a single refusal would render defence impermissible 
(this may be true of Elevator 3, for example). My view is thus both weaker and stronger 
than the Majority Consent Requirement. 
																																																						
75 I am assuming here that saving five innocent persons is the threshold at which collaterally killing one 
innocent person becomes proportionate. But these numbers are just for illustration. One may substitute 
whichever threshold ratio one wishes. 
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The account that I have proposed can be captured more precisely in the following 
aggregation principle: 
 
The Proportionate Consent Requirement: Other-defence is morally justified only if a 
sufficient sub-set of the members of the victim group consent to defensive intervention 
(or do not validly refuse). A sub-set is sufficient if the benefits of defence to the members 
of the sub-set are sufficient to justify the total amount of morally weighted harm that 
defending the group will cause. 
 
Here is a slightly more intuitive way of understanding this interpretation of the 
requirement. Since, on my account, a victim’s refusal serves to render the fact that they 
would benefit inadmissible for the purposes of establishing lesser-evil justifications for 
harm innocents, there is an important sense in which we can treat victims’ refusal as 
morally equivalent to their non-existence. Given this, one way of determining whether the 
consent requirement has been met in a particular case is by applying the following 
counterfactual test: If the (validly) refusing member(s) of a victim group did not exist, 
would it be permissible to cause the same harm to innocents in order to defend the 
remaining members? If the answer is no, the consent requirement has not been met and 
defence is impermissible. 
 
5. Obligations to Consent? Wrongful Refusal? 
  
A central idea behind the Proportionate Consent Requirement is that we should take each 
member of a victim group in isolation, so that the normative consequences that follow 
from each victim’s refusal are unaffected by the presence of the other victims. Put 
differently, we should treat each victim in a multiple-victim case in the same way that we 
would treat a single victim, and then proceed additively. Given this, one important line of 
objection to my proposal holds that there is some factor present in multiple-victim cases, 
absent in single-victim cases, which undermines this moral independence.  
Here is one obvious candidate: in multiple-victim cases each victim’s decision to 
refuse defensive intervention may significantly affect other victims’ prospects. This is 
especially salient on my account. Consider the following variation on Elevator 3: 
 
Elevator 3*: Five Victims are taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to 
saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victims and wishes them dead. 
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Rescuer is walking by and is able to kill Aggressor by throwing a grenade, 
thereby saving Victims. However, if she does so, the blast from the grenade 
will kill Bystander as a side-effect. Four Victims consent to Rescuer’s 
intervention, while one Victim (let’s call him Rafi) refuses because of his 
commitment to non-violence.  
 
According to the Proportionate Consent Requirement, Rafi’s refusal makes it 
impermissible for Rescuer to defend the group. By exercising his PPE, Rafi reduces the 
goods available to Rescuer to below the threshold at which she would have a lesser-evil 
justification for killing the bystander. Rafi’s decision is thus a matter of life or death for 
the remaining four Victims (on the assumption that Rescuer will only defend them if she 
is morally justified in doing so). This other-regarding feature of multiple-victim cases 
plausibly undermines the idea that each victim’s consent and refusal are morally 
independent. Instead, we might object that the fact that Rafi’s refusal would have serious 
negative consequences for others places limits on its moral effectiveness.  
More precisely, the objection under consideration consists in two distinct claims. 
The first is that Rafi would act morally wrongly by refusing defensive intervention. In fact, 
he is morally required to consent, because doing so will bring about the saving of four 
consenting victims (by furnishing Rescuer with a justification for defending them) and – 
by hypothesis – we have duties to perform easy rescues.76  The second claim holds, 
adopting an idea of David Estlund’s, that the fact that it would be wrong for Rafi to refuse 
renders his refusal morally invalid. In virtue of this invalidity, the normative situation is as 
it would have been had Rafi in fact consented.77 For our purposes, what this means is that 
Rafi’s good is in fact morally admissible for justifying defensive harm, because his attempt 
to exercise his PPE is unsuccessful. Since Rafi is morally required to make his good 
available for the sake of his co-victims, Rescuer may use Rafi’s moral resources without 
his authorisation. Hence – contra my proposal – Rescuer does in fact possess a lesser-evil 
justification for defending the group.  
This objection is notable in that it aims to show that the independence assumption 
is mistaken from within a broadly liberal/individualist picture of morality. It does not claim 
																																																						
76 A roughly parallel line of objection is suggested by Victor Tadros, who argues that victims of crime may 
have duties to authorise the punishment of offenders in order to protect future potential victims of crime. 
Tadros, The Ends of Harm, pp.297-298.  
77 David Estlund, Democratic Authority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), Ch.8. As Gopal 
Sreenivasan puts it, this view “treats the fact that Y should have consented to X’s j-ing as entailing the 
normative upshot that would have resulted had Y actually consented.” Gopal Sreenivasan, ‘‘Oh, but you 
should have’: Estlund on Normative Consent’, Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2009), 62-72, at 
p.67. 
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that there is anything morally special about defending groups, over and above the 
individuals that compose them. Instead, it holds that the moral independence of victims is 
undermined simply by individuals’ obligations to attend to the welfare of others. If 
successful, it is a mistake to claim that we may only justify defending groups of victims by 
appeal to benefits to victims who have not refused defensive intervention, because victims’ 
normative power to refuse is importantly limited by the effects that its exercise would have 
on others. In fact, if pushed far enough, the objection could be employed in defence of 
the sceptics’ Minimal Consent Requirement. On this view, if any member of a victim group 
consents to being defended (or does not validly refuse), all other members are required to 
consent in order to bring this about, and so their refusal is morally invalid.  
Though intuitively powerful, I believe this objection fails. Its force comes from an 
analogy between what I have called our ‘moral’ resources – the moral reasons arising from 
one’s good or welfare – and ordinary material resources over which we have powers of 
exclusion, such as our bodies and property. Given this, one straightforward response 
would be to accept the analogy, but deny that individuals can be subject to duties to use 
their resources – both material and moral – to assist others. But this is a rather extreme 
and unpalatable position. When it comes to material resources, it is very intuitive that 
individuals can be morally required to make life-saving contributions. It also seems 
plausible that, in at least some cases, refusing to contribute resources would be morally 
ineffective, and so others may use those resources without wronging their owner. For 
example, if I can easily save four lives by using my body to pull four non-swimmers from 
a shallow pond, I may be duty-bound to do so and others may use my body for that 
purpose if I refuse to do so myself without violating any claim of mine.78  
A more plausible line of response is to deny the resource analogy. We may accept 
that we are subject to rescue duties with respect to our material resources, but deny that 
we are similarly obligated when it comes to our moral resources. One way to argue for this 
is to identify differences in the burdensomeness of the two kinds of duty, since duties to 
assist are typically constrained by the costs to the duty-holder of discharging them. For 
example, we might hold that requiring a committed pacifist to use his own good in order 
to bring about killing would involve him acting against his conscience in a particularly 
egregious way. 79 By contrast, a duty to use one’s property to pull non-swimmers from 
shallow ponds would not. An obvious difficulty for this response, however, it that it 
																																																						
78 For detailed discussion of the connection between duties to aid and the permissibility of using others as a 
means, see Tadros, The Ends of Harm. 
79 Thanks to anonymous associate editor for suggesting this response. 
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requires a plausible explanation of why the importance of preserving one’s moral integrity 
should trump others’ interest in being protected from murder. There is something 
troubling about the idea that claims of conscience can enable us to evade duties to others.80  
I too think the objection fails due to a disanalogy between material and moral 
resources, but for a different, and more fundamental, reason. The previous response grants 
the assumption that victims have positive moral reasons to use their good for the sake of 
their co-victims in cases like Elevator 3*, but argues that these reasons do not generate a 
duty. By contrast, I argue that victims do not have any moral reason to use their good for 
the sake of others in cases like this. This is because we have no moral reason to create 
lesser-evil justifications for harming innocent people. If there is no reason to rescue others 
in this particular way, then victims cannot be under a duty to consent to defensive 
intervention, nor act wrongly by refusing to do so. Hence, there are no grounds for 
invalidating their refusal.81 
To help see this, it is useful to think about other ways in which we can use our 
good to create lesser-evil justifications, other than by consenting to third-party 
intervention. Consider the following case: 
 
Trolley: Aggressor has set a trolley rolling towards four innocent victims who 
are tied to the main tracks, because she hates them and wishes them dead. 
Rescuer can divert the trolley onto a side-track, thereby saving the four. 
However, there is an innocent bystander on the side-track who will be killed 
if she does so. Further down the main track, Barry is crossing the tracks on 
his way to work and sees events unfolding up the line. While he is crossing, 
the trolley also threatens his life, but he can avoid being threatened by stepping 
off the tracks. 
 
Assume, once more, that it is permissible to collaterally kill one innocent person in order 
to save five lives, but not to save four, and that Rescuer will only divert the trolley if she is 
justified in doing so. Barry then has two options. First, he can remain on the tracks and 
thereby bring about the saving of the four (by making his good available to justify Rescuer 
diverting the trolley). Second, he can step off the tracks and thereby fail to bring about the 
saving of the four (making his good unavailable to Rescuer.) Would Barry act wrongly by 
																																																						
80 For a detailed version of this objection as applied to duties to defend others from unjust attack, see Fabre, 
‘Mandatory Rescue Killings’, pp.378-384. 
81 This is not to deny that refusal may be morally wrong, and therefore potentially invalid, on different other-
regarding grounds. For example, if a victim refuses defensive intervention purely out of racist hatred for 
their co-victims. My claim is that refusal is not invalidated simply by the fact that its validity would result in 
other victims not being defended. For discussion of various other-regarding constraints on consent, see Grill, 
‘Liberalism, Altruism, and Group Consent.’ 
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stepping off the tracks? Does he have any moral reason to stay put? It seems clear (at least 
to me) that Barry has no such reason (for reasons I will elaborate on below). To emphasise 
this, imagine that Barry has already crossed the tracks before becoming aware of the 
situation up the line. Does he have any reason to step back onto the tracks in order to 
bring about the saving of the four? It seems absurd to think that he does. 
This case is intended to be relevantly analogous to Elevator 3*, in which four victims 
consent to defence while one (Rafi) refuses. Both Rafi and Barry have the ability to save 
four lives at the cost of one life by contributing their moral resources (by consenting to 
defensive intervention and by staying put, respectively). But if Barry has no reason to do 
so, this suggests the same should be true of Rafi.  If that’s right, then, contra the objection 
under consideration, victims do not act wrongly by refusing defensive intervention, even 
if this results in others not being defended from serious harm. Their refusal is therefore 
not invalidated and their good remains morally unavailable to rescuers, in line with The 
Proportionate Consent Requirement. 
One might object that there is an important difference between cases like Elevator 
3* and Trolley.82 In the former, Rafi has no control over whether he faces a threat, whereas 
in the latter Barry has a choice. This could be significant in two ways. First, individuals are 
not usually required to aid others if doing so would expose them to a threat of serious 
harm. If that is right, then we have a straightforward explanation of why Barry is under no 
obligation to create a lesser-evil justification that does not apply in Rafi’s case.  
The problem with this objection is that even if it shows that Barry is not required to 
step onto the tracks, it does nothing to explain the intuition that he lacks a moral reason to 
do so. Even if Barry were perfectly willing to expose himself to the threat in order to save 
the four, it’s still a bizarre thing to do. The objection therefore does not challenge my claim 
that victims like Rafi similarly have no moral reason to create lesser-evil justifications by 
consenting to defensive intervention. 
Second, and more promisingly, we might hold that an individual’s claim to 
defensive intervention is vitiated if they intentionally choose to expose themselves to a 
threat. If that is true, then Barry’s attempting to create a lesser-evil justification for saving 
the four by stepping onto the tracks would be self-defeating, since it would fail to add an 
additional claim to be rescued to those of the four. One might object that this is the 
explanation of why Barry not only lacks a duty but also a moral reason to create a 
justification for saving the four, which does not apply to involuntary victims such as Rafi. 
																																																						
82 Thanks to an anonymous associate editor for pressing me to consider the following two objections. 
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Hence, the fact that Barry clearly lacks the relevant reasons does not show that victims of 
aggression also lack them.  
However, we can see that considerations of self-defeat fail to explain Barry’s lack 
of reasons by considering cases in which he can trigger a lesser-evil justification without 
exposing himself to a threat: 
 
Trolley 2: Aggressor has set a trolley rolling towards four innocent victims 
who are tied to the main tracks, because she hates them and wishes them 
dead. Rescuer can divert the trolley onto a side-track, thereby saving the four. 
However, there is an innocent bystander on the side-track who will be killed 
if she does so. Barry is passing the tracks on his way to work and sees events 
unfolding up the line. Jimmy is sound asleep on a nearby bench. Barry is able 
to gently place Jimmy on the main track without waking him.   
 
Again, Barry clearly has no moral reason to manufacture a justification for saving the four 
at the cost of the bystander’s life. But this is not because it would be self-defeating to try. 
Since Jimmy would not have voluntarily placed himself in harm’s way his claim to be 
rescued would be undiminished, and so Rescuer would acquire a justification for diverting 
the trolley as a result of Barry’s action.  
One might respond that it would be independently morally wrong for Barry to use 
Jimmy in this way, and that this explains Barry’s lacking reason to perform it so. But this 
seems to misrepresent the normative situation. In normal cases of wrongfully using 
someone as an instrument to promote the good, the agent has a perfectly intelligible reason 
to do so, which is then defeated by the constraint on using others as a means. This doesn’t 
seem true of Barry; he has no such reason in the first place. Using Jimmy wouldn’t simply 
be wrong, it wouldn’t make sense.  
Putting aside intuitions about particular examples, here is a more general diagnosis 
of what makes these cases so odd. The objection that victims can be morally obligated to 
consent, in order to generate justifications for harming the innocent, relies on the idea that 
we can have moral reasons to alter the balance of moral reasons. This is not always 
problematic. For example, if Barry could push the innocent bystander off the side-track, 
thereby removing the moral barrier preventing Rescuer from saving the four, then he 
seems clearly justified in doing so. But when it comes to altering the balance of reasons in 
order to bring it about that rights against harm are overridden something has gone seriously wrong. 
For if the pre-existing reasons in favour of killing the innocent are insufficiently weighty 
to justify doing so, how can this generate any reason to add additional considerations in 
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favour of harming to the scales, in order to tip the balance? 83 To claim that there is such 
a reason requires counting the reasons in favour twice. That’s not only irrational, but also 
involves an objectionable attempt to circumvent the moral constraints that are properly 
imposed by individuals’ basic rights. It is this general failure of practical reasoning, I 
contend, that explains why victims have no reason to make their good available to rescuers.  
Let me elaborate in the context of Elevator 3*. The idea that Rafi is morally 
obligated to contribute his good in order to rescue his four co-victims seems compelling 
when we focus on the claims of the four who are in dire need. But this obscures the crucial 
fact that the weight of those claims has been fully accounted for in the moral calculus, and 
found to be defeated by the bystander’s claim not to be killed. We therefore cannot – on 
pain of double-counting – appeal to those claims in order to ground Rafi’s obligation to 
consent, and there are no remaining other-regarding reasons that could do the job. If 
anything, the claim of the bystander gives Rafi a reason not to consent. 
In summary: While we may have duties to help others perform independently 
justified actions – by using our bodies and property, for example – we do not have reason 
to do so by manufacturing lesser-evil justifications for their actions. Since the proposed 
objection to the Proportionate Consent Requirement relies on the claim that we do have 
such reasons, it should be rejected. 
 
  6. Conclusion: The Ethics of Protest 
 
By way of conclusion, let me sketch how my account of the role of consent in the morality 
of defensive harm may illuminate some wider practical issues, by looking at the case of 
political protest. 
Acts of public protest can have a variety of aims. In many cases the main goal 
seems to be indicative, in that the protesters are trying is draw attention to considerations 
that they believe decisively count against an action or policy. They can be interpreted as 
(loudly) giving others a report on their interpretation of the facts. But this is not the only 
function of protest. As well as providing information about the world, protest also seems 
to have a distinct expressive aim, in that the protesters are trying to communicate an attitude 
																																																						
83 Here is another way of bringing out this contrast, which focuses on our reasons to have certain attitudes, 
rather than our reasons to act: it seems perfectly reasonable for an uninvolved third-party to regret the 
presence of the bystander on the side-track in Trolley, who prevents the four from being saved. But it seems 
very odd to regret the absence of an additional victim on the main-track, whose presence would make it 
permissible to save the four by killing the bystander. 
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of personal disapproval towards the object of protest. In addition, the account of consent 
and refusal that I have sketched suggests that protest may also have a third, transformative 
function, whereby the act of protest itself counts against the justification of the action or 
policy being protested. Protesters may be interpreted not simply as giving a report or 
expressing an attitude, but also as exercising a normative power: the power to withhold 
their consent to the policy being protested, and thereby prevent the fact that the policy 
may benefit them from contributing to its justification.  
The protests in Britain against the 2003 invasion of Iraq (or at least a slightly 
idealised version) are a useful case to illustrate this idea.84 The protesters’ rallying cry of 
“Not in My Name!” can be understood in the indicative, expressive, and transformative 
senses outlined above.85 Clearly, one thing the protesters were trying to do was to highlight 
certain perceived facts about the war – that it lacked a just cause, for example. But the 
protest also had a self-regarding aspect to it; the protesters were communicating that they 
did not endorse the war being fought on their behalf. If we treat this as merely expressive, 
it may seem morally trivial, or even self-indulgent (“It’s not all about you!”). However, if 
we understand protest as having a transformative function, as I have suggested, it may 
have considerable moral significance. One of the main justifications given (at least initially) 
by the British government for participating in the invasion was that doing so would help 
protect Britain and its residents from attack by WMDs and terrorist groups harboured by 
the Iraqi regime.86 If we interpret the anti-war protesters as exercising a power to withhold 
consent, one consequence of their protest was to prevent a portion of that putative benefit 
from contributing to the justification of the invasion. On this view, the existence of protest 
may itself have made the invasion harder to justify that it otherwise would have been, 
independently of the other factors that may have counted against it. 
																																																						
84 For an illuminating discussion of this case, and of anti-war protest in general, see John Williams, ‘“Not in 
My Name”: Legitimate Authority and Liberal Just War Theory’ in Anthony F. Lang Jr., Cian O’Driscoll, and 
John Williams (eds), Just War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2013), 63-80. Williams also understands the moral significance of protest in terms of withdrawing consent, 
though his account of the normative consequences of withdrawal differs from my own. 
85 For a different take on the relevance of the protesters’ slogan to the permissibility of force, see Pattison, 
‘Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention’, p.577. 
86 As Tony Blair made clear in his address to the nation on the eve of the invasion: “The threat to Britain 
today is not that of my father’s generation. War between the big powers is unlikely, Europe is at peace, the 
Cold War already a memory. But this new world faces a new threat of disorder and chaos born either of 
brutal states like Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our 
way of life, our freedom, our democracy. My fear, deeply held, based in part on the intelligence that I see is 
that these threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our country and our world.” Prime Minister’s 
Address to the Nation. March 20th 2003. Full transcript available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2870581.stm [last accessed 20th December 2016]. 
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This last point highlights that the transformative function of protest can be morally 
successful even if the indicative and expressive aspects fail (for example, because the action 
or policy lacks independent moral defects for protesters to highlight, or because the 
protestors are entirely ignored by their intended audience). Even in these cases, the mere 
fact of protest may successfully diminish the justification for the action or policy. In some 
cases, the existence of protest may even be sufficient to render an action or policy morally 
unjustified, independently of its other moral merits or defects.  
 
  
 
	
	
	
